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illegal targeting of bass

The illegal targeting of bass and a reluctance to enforce

Bycatch or By Design? How Regulators Failed to Stop Illegal Bass Netting

The Uncomfortable Numbers: Bass “Bycatch” in Name Only

Nearly 70% of all net-caught bass landed into Mevagissey came from trips where bass made up 90–100% of the catch (henry-gilbey.com). This is plainly inconsistent with the idea of “unavoidable bycatch” – the legal fiction that these Cornish gillnetters were actually targeting other fish and only incidentally catching bass. In reality, they’ve been hauling in bass almost exclusively, trip after trip, under the guise of bycatch. The pattern holds across Cornwall: fully 51% of all net-caught bass landed in the county in 2019 came from trips where bass comprised 90–100% of the catch (henry-gilbey.com). These numbers beg the question – if bass is supposedly an incidental catch, what were these boats targeting? The landing data suggests an uncomfortable answer: they were targeting bass all along, flouting regulations in plain sight.

This isn’t a new or localised observation. Sea-angling activists and environmental campaigners have sounded the alarm for years. Gillnets are a selective gear – fishers choose mesh sizes and locations based on the species they want to catch. Industry representatives themselves boast that gillnets are highly species-specific (henry-gilbey.com). So, when a gillnetter’s hold is overflowing with bass and little else, it strains credulity to call it “unavoidable bycatch.” As one campaign group wryly observed after poring over the data: “So much for ‘unavoidable bycatch’!” (henry-gilbey.com). The implication is clear: some commercial netters are blatantly targeting European seabass – an overfished, tightly regulated species – and getting away with it by labeling their catches as accidental.

From Free-for-All to Bycatch-Only: A Brief History of Bass Regulations

How did we get here? The story goes back to the mid-2010s, when alarm bells were ringing over the collapse of European seabass stocks. Up to that point, bass had been a free-for-all: commercial trawlers, netters, and anglers all heavily exploited this valuable fish. In 2015, facing scientific advice of a looming stock crisis, regulators finally took action. The UK government pressed the EU to enact emergency measures, and a package was rolled out (researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk):

  • January 2015 – Spawning Season Ban: A moratorium on pelagic trawling for bass (mid-water trawls that target spawning aggregations) was imposed from late January through April 2015 (researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk). This aimed to protect the species during its breeding season.

  • March 2015 – Recreational Bag Limits: For the first time, recreational anglers faced a catch limit (initially 3 bass per day) (researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk) – a stark change for a community that had long operated with minimal restrictions.

  • June 2015 – Commercial Catch Limits by Gear: Perhaps most critically, EU fisheries ministers agreed to cap commercial bass landings on a monthly basis by gear type (researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk). The idea was to prevent directed bass fishing by limiting how much each vessel could land, depending on whether they used nets, hooks, or trawls.

  • Mid-2015 – Higher Minimum Size: The minimum landing size for bass was raised from 36 cm to 42 cm. (researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk), so that only more mature bass could be kept, allowing juveniles a chance to grow and spawn.

Despite these emergency measures, bass stocks kept sliding, prompting even tougher rules in subsequent years. By 2016, a half-year ban on commercial bass fishing was in place: from January 1 to June 30, most commercial bass fishing was prohibited (with only small allowances for certain methods), and even in the latter half of 2016 no vessel could land more than 1 tonne of bass per month (researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk). The message was unmistakable – targeting bass as a primary fishery was supposed to stop.

Regulators then moved to institutionalise these restrictions through annual quota regulations. In **2017, a new EU bass conservation framework kicked in, fundamentally changing bass from a target fishery to a “bycatch-only” species for certain gears. Under Council Regulation (EU) 2017/127, fixed gillnets and similar static nets were only permitted to land bass as unavoidable bycatch (gov.uk). In practice, that meant a Cornish netter could no longer lawfully set out with the intention of catching bass. They were given a small allowance to cover incidental catches while fishing for other species – at most 250 kg of bass per month in 2017 for vessels with the proper authorisationgov.uk. Demersal trawlers and seiners were likewise limited to a tiny bass bycatch (no more than 3% of the day’s catch, up to 400 kg per month) (gov.uk). All other commercial methods (like drift nets, or any vessel without a bass authorisation) were outright banned from keeping any bass (gov.uk). The only commercial sector still allowed a direct bass fishery were hook-and-line crews – and even they faced a strict annual cap (10 tonnes per vessel in 2017) and a closed season during February–March spawn months (gov.uk).

Crucially, the UK introduced a “track record” licensing system: only vessels that had historically landed bass (in a 2015–2016 reference period) were granted authorisations to retain bass going forward (gov.uk). Everyone else – including any new entrants – must release any bass they catch, by law. The intent was to freeze the bass fishing effort at minimal levels and prevent a rush of new fishers exploiting the species.

These rules, crafted by DEFRA and agreed at EU level, were seen as drastic but necessary. The language was unambiguous about the bycatch-only status for nets and trawls. For example, the 2017 UK Fisheries Guidance bluntly states: “Fixed gillnets… are permitted [to] retain bass as a bycatch when targeting other species… up to 250 kg per month as an unavoidable bycatch” (gov.uk). Similar phrasing appeared in EU regulations for subsequent years – e.g. in 2019 fixed netters were limited to “unavoidable by‑catches not exceeding 1.4 tonnes per vessel per year” (nffo.org.uk). In short, since 2017, it has been illegal for fixed-net fishermen to target bass; they can only keep a small amount if they inadvertently catch bass despite fishing for something else (henry-gilbey.com).

Bycatch allowances for nets have generally hovered between ~1.2 and 1.8 tonnes per vessel per year as the rules evolved (cmscoms.com) (anglingtrust.net). (The current 2025 limit for UK fixed netters is about 1.8 tonnes/year (anglingtrust.net), reflecting a slight easing after signs of stock improvement.) But whether the cap was 250 kg per month (as in 2017) or 1.4 tonnes per year (2019), the core principle remained constant: no dedicated bass netting. Any bass landed in nets was supposed to be minor and incidental.

So much for theory. In practice, these measures only work if enforced – and that’s where things have fallen apart.

The “Unavoidable Bycatch” Loophole – and Lack of Definition

From the outset, one glaring weakness undercut the bycatch-only regime: “Bycatch” was never clearly defined. The regulations set quantitative limits (in kilos or percentages) on bass landings, but nowhere did they spell out how authorities should distinguish a legitimate “bycatch” catch from an illegal targeted haul. There is no hard threshold for what proportion of a trip’s catch can be bass, beyond the weight limit, in the fixed net fishery. The result? A wily operator can hit the bass allowance consistently and still claim it was all incidental.

Both campaigners and some regulators quickly identified this loophole. In October 2021, the conservation news site Ocean & Coastal Futures summarised the issue starkly: “There is no definition of what constitutes bycatch, and no limits on the amount… [this] gives those fishermen a green light to illegally target bass and land it as ‘bycatch’.”(cmscoms.com). Cornwall’s IFCA – the very body charged with policing inshore fishing in Cornwall – effectively admitted it was hamstrung by the lack of definition. The IFCA stated that “whilst no definition exists, there is no option but to treat [EU] monthly or annual bass bycatch allowances as straightforward catch limits, regardless of any other fish landed.”(cmscoms.com) In other words, as long as a netter stayed under the kilo cap, Cornwall IFCA wouldn’t question whether the catch was really “bycatch” at all. The bycatch rule, meant to be a conservation tool, morphed in enforcement practice into just a quota.

This was never the intent. The whole point of declaring bass a bycatch-only species for netters was to compel fishermen to avoid catching bass as much as possible. As one DEFRA negotiator put it, focusing on “unavoidable bycatch” was supposed to shift fisher behavior – to make them change where, when, and how they fish so as not to catch bass (cmscoms.com). But without an enforcement hook (such as a definition or percentage threshold), the rule’s effectiveness hinged on voluntary compliance and the honesty of fishers’ intentions. That compliance largely did not materialise in Cornwall. Instead, many netters treated the allowance as just another quota to be maximised. If 1.4 tonnes a year of bass were available, some went out and caught exactly that, “bycatch” or not.

In a candid December 2020 assessment, even the UK Government recognised that this approach had failed. The government conceded that “applying an unavoidable bycatch condition to the gillnetting derogation rather than focusing on the desired outcome… has been a flawed management concept, and it described the undefined “unavoidable bycatch” criterion as “ineffective.” (cmscoms.com) This was a remarkable admission: essentially, DEFRA acknowledged that by hinging bass protection on an undefined bycatch concept, they undermined their own policy.

To put it simply, the law told fishermen “Don’t target bass,” but never defined what targeting looks like. And if you can’t define it, it’s devilishly hard to prove a violation in court. Is a catch that is 50% bass by weight a targeted trip, or just bad luck? What about 90% bass? Common sense screams that such catches are deliberate, but regulators boxed themselves in by not codifying that common sense into a rule. Some European countries (and indeed the EU for trawlers) use a percentage rule – for example, trawl and seine vessels face a 10% per trip bass bycatch limit under UK rules (gov.uk), ensuring bass remains a minor part of any haul. No such percentage rule was ever instituted for fixed nets in the UK. Campaigners have been urging one – Save Our Sea Bass (SOS) has repeatedly called for a per-trip bass percentage cap for netters to close the loophole (cmscoms.com) – but so far, policymakers have demurred.

Cornwall’s “Bycatch” Bass Boom and Regulatory Inertia

Cornwall has become ground zero for this regulatory failure. One would expect that with strict limits in place, bass landings by fixed nets would have dropped sharply after 2017. And indeed, in many parts of England and Wales, commercial bass catches did decline as intended (henry-gilbey.com). But Cornwall’s story was different. Bass landings from fixed netters in Cornwall surged in the years after the bycatch rule came in – defying the national trend and the spirit of the law.

By 2019, the MMO’s official landing statistics (obtained via Freedom of Information by SOS) painted an alarming picture. While in most English ports bass bycatch remained a trickle, in Cornwall it was a flood. As noted, more than half of all bass caught in nets in Cornwall came from trips that were virtually pure bass (henry-gilbey.com). Total netted bass landings in Cornwall actually increased year-on-year when they should have been decreasing. Save Our Sea Bass uncovered that net-caught bass landings in Cornwall in 2019 were 70% higher than in 2017 (henry-gilbey.com) – a 140% increase from one year to the next, which Cornwall IFCA incredibly tried to claim “was not significant” (henry-gilbey.com). (When confronted, officials chose an absurdly tiny chart scale to mask the spike; only when plotted on a sensible scale did the 140% jump become obvious (henry-gilbey.com).)

Equally telling was a comparison to elsewhere. Angling representatives pointed out that “landings have plummeted in the rest of England as a result of measures to protect bass, but they have gone up in Cornwall” (henry-gilbey.com). This raises a red flag: the regulations were the same nationwide – so why was Cornwall an outlier? The inescapable conclusion is enforcement (or lack thereof). Cornwall’s waters were still yielding bass as if it were 2014, regulatory paperwork notwithstanding.

Enforcement in Cornwall falls primarily to the Cornwall Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority (Cornwall IFCA) for the 0–6 nautical mile zone, working alongside the national Marine Management Organisation (MMO). By law, Cornwall IFCA “is legally required to address” fisheries problems in its district – it cannot simply ignore a conservation issue on the grounds that rules are set at national/EU level (henry-gilbey.com). Yet that appears to be exactly what happened. For years, Cornwall IFCA took a hands-off approach to the bass issue, effectively waving it away as someone else’s problem.

When pressure mounted in 2020 over the suspicious landings, Cornwall IFCA staff initially denied there was a problem. According to an SOS briefing, IFCA officers told their governing committee that there was “no problem” and that Cornwall IFCA had not been remiss in failing to monitor landing data (henry-gilbey.com). They argued any concern would be handled in a future “Net Fishery Management Plan” – essentially kicking the can down the road (henry-gilbey.com). Meanwhile, they deflected responsibility: pointing out that “bass has been managed by measures set by the EU and the MMO” (henry-gilbey.com). True enough in principle, but Cornwall IFCA is the frontline enforcer in inshore waters – passing the buck to the EU (which only sets rules) and the MMO (which mainly handles licensing and offshore enforcement) was a dereliction of duty. As SOS retorted, “Cornwall IFCA cannot pass the buck – if bass measures are not working in Cornwall, Cornwall IFCA is legally required to address that problem.” (henry-gilbey.com)

When pressed on why they hadn’t scrutinised the landings data, IFCA officials made the almost comical excuse that obtaining the data was difficult, citing the need for a new data-sharing agreement with MMO – this while Cornwall IFCA shares the same building as MMO’s local office (henry-gilbey.com)! In fact, the landing figures were readily accessible to anyone who asked MMO, as Save Our Sea Bass had demonstrated (henry-gilbey.com). The IFCA’s posture appeared less about can’t and more about won’t.

Cornwall IFCA even tried to downplay the egregious catch composition evidence. In a 2020 meeting they presented an averaged statistic, claiming that Cornish vessels were only using 40% of their bass “allocation” on average (for 2017–2019), implying there was plenty of headroom and thus no cause for concern (henry-gilbey.com). This was deeply misleading. As SOS pointed out, an average of 40% utilisation hides the fact that many vessels took zero bass (pulling the average down), while some vessels were likely maxing out their limits (henry-gilbey.com). Cornwall IFCA’s own cited figure of 37.65% average utilisation in Mevagissey actually indicates a very high uptake by those actively fishing bass (henry-gilbey.com). They did the math: if all English bass netters and hook-and-liners used 40% of their limits, the catch would blow past 1,500 tonnes – far above the total commercial catch advised for all of Northern Europe in 2020 (around 1,200 tonnes) (henry-gilbey.com). In other words, Cornwall’s “modest” 40% average was only because many fishermen respected the intent and caught no bass, while a subset aggressively targeted bass. Averages can hide a multitude of sins (henry-gilbey.com), and in this case, they concealed an ongoing illegal fishery.

Some members of Cornwall IFCA’s committee were not convinced by staff denials and pressed the issue. Public questions were raised: “Does Cornwall IFCA accept that it has an urgent problem with net-caught bass landings…? Landings have plummeted in the rest of England… but they have gone up in Cornwall.” (henry-gilbey.com). The IFCA’s response was a masterclass in obfuscation: “Cornwall IFCA doesn’t hold any specific information on the [bass] stock within the six-mile limit to be able to assess whether these levels constitute an urgent problem.” (henry-gilbey.com) They essentially shrugged that without localised stock data, who’s to say if catching more bass is a problem? This, as SOS drily noted, is nonsense: bass stocks are assessed at a broad regional (Northern European) level; one cannot claim extractions in Cornwall are fine just because you lack a Cornwall-specific stock number (henry-gilbey.com). The bass stock is a shared resource, and everyone was supposed to be cutting back – including Cornwall.

Even when presented with legal tools to act, Cornwall IFCA dragged its feet. In late 2019, the IFCA actually voted against an emergency byelaw that would have required larger mesh sizes in nets to reduce the catch of juvenile bass (henry-gilbey.com). This was despite Fish Legal (the Angling Trust’s legal arm) advising that such a byelaw would be lawful and appropriate under the circumstances (henry-gilbey.com). IFCA officials argued an emergency byelaw had already been considered and rejected, so they couldn’t revisit it – a claim that was flatly incorrect according to Cornwall IFCA’s own constitution (which allows re-consideration after 6 months) (henry-gilbey.com). Instead of taking action, the IFCA pointed to EU measures (which had just modestly increased the minimum mesh size for bass nets to 100mm) and claimed that solved the juvenile issue (henry-gilbey.com). In reality, 100mm mesh is still perfectly capable of gilling undersized bass – so Cornwall essentially left the nursery door open. All of this led frustrated conservationists to accuse Cornwall IFCA of “multiple bass-related failings” and having a “tattered reputation” on bass management (henry-gilbey.com).

Enforcement Double Standards: Little Fish Get Fried, Big Fish Go Free

One of the most striking aspects of this saga is who gets punished when bass rules are broken. While commercial netters in Cornwall were largely given a free pass to carry on targeting bass under the “bycatch” smokescreen, recreational anglers have faced the full force of the law for much smaller transgressions. In July 2020, Cornwall IFCA proudly announced the prosecution of an angler who was caught retaining bass illegally – specifically, this individual had used both rod-and-line and a fixed net from shore to catch bass, exceeding the recreational limits (anglingtrust.net). The case is illuminating: the IFCA’s enforcement officers presented evidence that the angler’s net had an unusually large mesh size “for its supposed target species,” clearly indicating that bass was the intended catch (anglingtrust.net). The court evidently agreed – the angler was convicted and fined.

This example proves that enforcement authorities can, when motivated, demonstrate illegal targeting by analysing gear and catch patterns. If a shore netter claims to be targeting (say) mullet but uses a mesh size ideal for bass, enforcement can rightly call BS. The obvious question is: why hasn’t the same scrutiny been applied to commercial netters? If a commercial gillnetter repeatedly lands 90–100% bass, year after year, often using the same mesh size and fishing grounds known for bass, isn’t that just as obvious as the recreational case? The Angling Trust and others have pointed out this glaring double standard: “If such evidence can be used against an angler, why are commercial netters given a free pass?”(anglingtrust.net).

It’s hard to escape the conclusion that there has been an enforcement reluctance when it comes to commercial violators. Part of it may be political – commercial fishers have livelihoods at stake and are often vocal, organised stakeholders in the region, whereas an individual hobbyist angler is an easier target. Part of it may be logistical – monitoring and proving a pattern of illegal targeting requires analysis of landing data over time and perhaps covert observation on the fishing grounds, which is resource-intensive. And part of it has been the aforementioned legal ambiguity – without an explicit definition, an enforcer has to convince a judge that the intent of the fisher was illegal, something defense lawyers would fight tooth and nail.

That said, the law is certainly there to be enforced. Under both EU law (when it applied) and now domestic law, exceeding a bass catch limit or fishing for bass without authorisation is an offence. So too is breaching any condition of the fishing authorisation. The “bycatch-only” rule effectively operates as a condition: you may only keep bass if they were bycatch in another fishery. A savvy prosecutor could argue that a boat consistently landing mostly bass has breached that condition – they were not engaged in a genuine alternate-target fishery, thus their retention of bass was unlawful. The challenge lies in evidence: demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that the fisher intended to catch bass (or at least didn’t try to avoid them).

There are telltales. Catch composition is one – no one would believe a vessel catching 100% bass was aiming for pollack. Gear and methods are another – using a specific mesh size in a known bass hotspot at the peak of bass season is indicative. Even timing and location – e.g., setting nets in shallow surf zones in winter, where bass school, rather than where flatfish or mullet might be – could be used to infer targeting. These pieces of circumstantial evidence can build a case. Indeed, in the recreational prosecution, it was precisely such evidence (mesh and catch mix) that nailed the culprit (anglingtrust.net).

Despite the difficulty, one cannot accept that the law is unenforceable. If that were true, we might as well not have the law! The better view is that enforcement bodies chose the path of least resistance – simply enforcing the quota (weights) and turning a blind eye to the nature of the catches. Cornwall IFCA essentially said as much: they treated the allowance as a quota and didn’t pursue further questions (cmscoms.com). It’s a dereliction that has effectively rewarded the most brazen rule-breakers. Those netters who respected the intent and tried to avoid bass got less or none of the quota; those who flouted it grabbed the bass and faced no consequences as long as they stayed under the kilo cap. It’s a textbook case of moral hazard in fisheries management.

Meanwhile, the broader impacts are significant. Bass is a slow-growing, late-maturing species; the stock is still in a precarious state (though recovering). Every extra unreported or under-reported tonne taken by illegal targeting undermines recovery efforts that honest fishers (commercial and recreational alike) have sacrificed for. Moreover, the economic value of bass to the recreational sector is enormous – U.K. sea angling for bass contributes millions of pounds to coastal economies in the form of tackle sales, charter boat bookings, tourism, etc. (anglingtrust.net). When netters illicitly target bass and depress the stock or local abundance, they directly undercut these sustainable economic benefits. Anglers have accepted strict bag limits (currently 2 bass per day for much of the year for UK anglers) and even complete no-take periods in some years, on the promise that everyone is tightening their belts to rebuild the fishery. Seeing commercial nets continue to pull out large volumes under the table not only harms the stock but breeds cynicism and anger. It risks a breakdown of trust in the regulations overall.

Can Bass “Bycatch” Abuses Be Prosecuted? (Legal Avenues)

Legally, what can be done? Are these netters actually in breach of the law, and if so, why haven’t prosecutions followed? The situation straddles a line between black-letter law and enforcement discretion. Under the law as written, a fixed netter must not “fish for” bass – that is prohibited. They may only retain bass caught unintentionally within set limits (henry-gilbey.com) (nffo.org.uk). A netter who sets out to target bass is thus breaking the law from the moment they deploy their gear. However, proving someone’s intent (i.e., that they were fishing for bass, not something else) is the tricky part. The fisherman can always claim: “I was targeting species X, I just happened to catch bass.” With no definition of bycatch, the case could devolve into a he-said, she-said about the fisher’s state of mind, unless there’s strong circumstantial evidence as discussed.

Criminal prosecution is one route. The MMO and IFCAs have authority to investigate and bring cases for fisheries offences. An ideal approach would involve building a dossier on the worst-offending vessels: analysing their landings over multiple trips, noting patterns (e.g., consistently high bass percentages, perhaps sudden drops in reported bass if they fear attention, etc.), and combining that with intelligence from patrols (e.g., observing them setting nets in certain areas or using certain gear). If a vessel oversteps the letter of the law (e.g., exceeds the weight limit or fishes in a closed season), that’s a straightforward prosecution. But even within the allowance, a prosecution could be attempted on the basis that the allowance was only for unavoidable bycatch and that the catches were avoidable (since they were effectively targeted). The charge might be framed as fishing without a valid bass authorisation (if one argues they voided their authorisation by not complying with its conditions), or simply violating the prohibition on fishing for bass.

The downside of a criminal case is the burden of proof – beyond reasonable doubt – and the possibility that a clever defense and an ambiguous law could result in an acquittal, potentially setting a bad precedent. That fear may have made regulators skittish about going to court without a slam-dunk case.

Civil avenues offer an alternative or complementary approach. One option is regulatory: license sanctions. The MMO, which issues fishing vessel licenses and the special bass authorisations, could potentially suspend or revoke a bass authorisation for vessels that are suspected of abusing it. The license conditions for bass could be tightened (e.g., adding a specific condition defining bycatch qualitatively or requiring a certain mix of non-bass species). If a vessel is found to consistently catch only bass, the MMO might have grounds to say they are not adhering to the spirit of the authorisation and move to strip it. This would likely provoke an appeal or legal challenge from the fisher, but it’s a tool in the box.

From the perspective of those outside government, the nuclear option is a judicial review of the regulators’ inaction. Under UK law, a public body like an IFCA or the MMO has a duty to exercise its functions in accordance with applicable law and policy (including conservation duties). One could argue that Cornwall IFCA’s failure to enforce the bass bycatch rule is so irrational or unreasonable as to be unlawful – especially given the clear evidence of non-compliance and the IFCA’s statutory duty to conserve fisheries. A judicial review could seek a court order compelling the IFCA to act or at least to explain why it is not acting.

Such cases are difficult – courts are generally reluctant to second-guess resource allocation decisions by regulators. The IFCA could defend itself by saying it prioritises other enforcement or that it lacked clear evidence to prosecute, etc. However, the public statements by Cornwall IFCA (essentially shrugging off the issue) (cmscoms.com) and the contrast with its zealous enforcement against anglers could bolster a claim that the IFCA is acting inconsistently and failing to meet its conservation mandate. Notably, the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, which created IFCAs, explicitly tasks them with achieving sustainable fisheries and protecting the marine environment. Also, the newer Fisheries Act 2020 sets out sustainability objectives (including reducing bycatch and protecting individual stocks) that all authorities are supposed to further. If an IFCA is seen to blatantly ignore rampant non-compliance that endangers a stock, one could argue it’s failing those statutory duties.

Another potential avenue is to press DEFRA and the MMO at the national level. The bass Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for English and Welsh waters, published in late 2023, acknowledges the enforcement issue. One of its stated goals (Goal 4) is to “ensure full compliance with bass regulations” with a focus on “targeted enforcement” and better cooperation between agencies (defrafmp.blog.gov.uk). In fact, a memorandum of understanding for data-sharing between MMO and IFCAs has been mooted, recognising that basic steps like sharing landing reports promptly could help identify problems (defrafmp.blog.gov.uk). Stakeholders should hold the government to these commitments. It’s one thing to put promises in an FMP document; it’s another to actually deliver boots-on-deck enforcement in Cornwall’s coves at 5 AM on a winter morning. Continued public scrutiny (via media exposés like this, questions in Parliament, etc.) can push DEFRA and the MMO to put real effort and funding into bass enforcement.

Finally, closing the legal loophole would remove any excuse. This means defining “bycatch” for bass in law or regulation. The simplest fix: impose a per-trip percentage limit for fixed nets, similar to the 10% rule for trawlers (gov.uk). For example, a rule could state: on any fishing trip, bass may not exceed, say, 20% of the total catch weight (and still within the monthly tonnage cap). If a boat lands 100 kg of fish, no more than 20 kg can be bass. This would force mixed catches and make it black-and-white that a 90% bass trip is illegal. Alternatively, regulators could even consider seasonal or spatial closures for nets during times/areas bass aggregate (much like the initial 2015 pelagic ban, or as the EU has done by prohibiting even recreational fixed-netting for bass in certain areas (cmscoms.com) (eur-lex.europa.eu)). In fact, in 2017 the UK did ban all shore-based netting for bass (beach seiners and stake nets used by part-time commercial shore fishers). But in 2021, that ban was controversially reversed with a new derogation allowing limited shore netting “bycatch” with no clear definition (cmscoms.com). As Ocean & Coastal Futures noted, the 2021 rule change re-opened shore netting and even omitted the winter spawning closure, causing discards, making it “difficult to reconcile with sustainability objectives”(cmscoms.com). Many see that as a step backward. Bolstering the close season during the spawning months (January–April) for netting inshore could be another important measure to ensure bass aren’t hammered when most vulnerable.

Closing the Net: How to Trigger Real Enforcement

This investigative look at Cornwall’s bass “bycatch” scandal reveals a microcosm of a larger issue: well-intended regulations can fail if not backed by political will and on-the-ground enforcement. So what can be done to right the ship?

1. Campaigner & Public Pressure: Continued public spotlight is essential. Anglers and conservationists have been doing the right thing – gathering evidence, publishing analyses, and demanding action. The Angling Trust’s recent call-to-arms (branding it the “bass bycatch scandal”) is rallying anglers to report suspicious nets and demand enforcement (anglingtrust.net). Every incident reported creates a paper trail that is harder for IFCAs/MMO to ignore. Citizens in Cornwall can attend IFCA meetings (or watch webcasts) and directly question the officials – holding their feet to the fire. Politicians, too, should feel the heat: local MPs and even ministers hear from the recreational fishing constituency and others concerned that a public resource is being stolen. The more noise made, the more likely those in charge will direct resources to the issue.

2. Legal Advocacy: Organisations like Fish Legal can continue to explore legal actions. A pre-action letter threatening judicial review, citing Cornwall IFCA’s own words about treating limits as quotas and the clear evidence of non-compliance, could spur the IFCA to avoid court by stepping up patrols and inspections. Even the prospect of being dragged into court can be a powerful motivator for a public body to change behavior. If that fails, actually proceeding with a judicial review might be warranted – not necessarily to punish the IFCA, but to get a court declaration that ignoring the targeting of bass is unlawful. That could set a precedent forcing all IFCAs to take such matters seriously.

3. Policy Reform: DEFRA should not delay in tightening the regulations. The bass FMP process offers a vehicle to do this. Stakeholders on the Bass Management Group (being formed under the FMP (defrafmp.blog.gov.uk)) can push for a clear definition of allowable bass bycatch. This should be treated with urgency as a “short-term measure” under Goal 4 of the FMP. A change to license conditions or a new statutory instrument could introduce a percentage rule or other enforceable criteria within months. Unlike the EU days, the UK now has flexibility to tailor its own rules quickly – there’s no excuse for paralysis. DEFRA’s own admission that the unavoidable bycatch condition was a flawed concept (cmscoms.com) should drive them to fix it post-haste.

4. Enhanced Monitoring: Enforcement agencies should leverage technology to monitor compliance. Requiring vessels that exploit the bass bycatch allowance to use vessel monitoring systems (VMS) or even cameras could deter blatant targeting. Even without expensive new programs, better use of existing data is key: MMO fisheries data analysts can flag vessels with anomalously high bass catches and share that intel with Cornwall IFCA in real time. A targeted list of “vessels of concern” could then receive dockside inspections or at-sea boarding to check what else they are catching. If a netter claiming to target pollack never seems to have much pollack in the nets, that’s grounds for scrutiny.

5. Prosecuting a Test Case: It may be worth selecting an egregious case and going forward with prosecution to test the waters. If successful, it sets a precedent and sends shockwaves through the gillnet fleet. If it fails due to legal ambiguity, that failure would itself underscore to lawmakers that the rules need tightening. Sometimes enforcement and legislation evolve iteratively – a court case can clarify how a law is interpreted, and if it’s too weak, the law gets revised. Either way, a public prosecution would have a deterrent effect; even an attempt signals that the free ride is over.

6. Strengthen IFCA Accountability: The Cornwall IFCA example suggests a lack of accountability. IFCA members (comprising councillors, community members, and reps from various sectors) should be ensuring officers do their job. Perhaps an independent review of Cornwall IFCA’s performance on bass is needed. The IFCA model only works if the local authority has the will to act. If not, one could argue for MMO taking over certain enforcement responsibilities. Indeed, MMO officers are cross-warranted to work in IFCA districts and could step in where an IFCA falls short (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk). Pushing for such intervention is another route – essentially asking MMO to directly oversee bass compliance in Cornwall’s inshore zone until the IFCA proves effective.

In conclusion, the bycatch-only rule for bass in fixed nets was a sound conservation measure undermined by poor implementation. Cornwall’s high-percentage bass landings have no genuine legal foundation – they exist in that grey area of unenforced rules, effectively a de facto breach of UK fisheries law. It can be fixed. With clear definitions, robust enforcement, and the resolve to prosecute or sanction violators, the loophole can be closed and the bass stock given the protection that was intended. The onus is now on DEFRA, the MMO, and Cornwall IFCA to prove that post-Brexit Britain’s claim of “world-class fisheries management” isn’t just hollow talk (henry-gilbey.com). And if they won’t act, then anglers, conservationists, and legal advocates must force their hand – for the good of the bass, and all who cherish this iconic fishery.

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